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Until the late 1970s, capital controls were widely used to prevent the free
ﬂow of funds between countries. A cautious relaxation of such controls
during the 1980s proved consistent with greater economic integration
among advanced countries and strengthened the case for capital market
opening more generally. By the early 1990s, capital controls appeared to be
ﬁnished as a serious policy tool for relatively open economies (Bhagwati
1998a). Today, however, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, the role of cap-
ital controls is being reconsidered.
In this reassessment of capital controls, recent experience in Malaysia—
which reimposed capital controls in September 1998—has been central to
the two main views on capital controls. The more established view empha-
sizes macroeconomics. If a country faces a severe external crisis, particu-
larly one caused by pure panic, and if orthodox macroeconomic policies
have failed to restore conﬁdence, Krugman (1998) argues that imposing
capital controls may be an eﬀective way to stabilize the economy.1 More
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Simon Johnson, Kalpana Kochhar, Todd Mitton, and
Natalia Tamirisagenerally, Bhagwati (1998a, 1998b) and Rodrik (2000) oppose the conven-
tional wisdom that free capital ﬂows help countries beneﬁt from trade lib-
eralization, and argue instead that capital market liberalization invites
speculative attacks. In this context, Malaysia’s experience has been inter-
preted as demonstrating that capital controls can have positive macroeco-
nomic eﬀects (Kaplan and Rodrik 2001), but this claim is controversial and
has been forcefully opposed by Dornbusch (2001).2
The second view of capital controls puts greater emphasis on institu-
tions (i.e., the rules, practices, and organizations that govern an economy).
Speciﬁcally, Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that capital controls are an
essential part of the package of policies that allows “relationship-based”
capitalism to function. In this system, informal relationships between
politicians and banks channel lending toward approved ﬁrms, and this is
easier to sustain when a country is relatively isolated from international
capital ﬂows. If capital controls are relaxed, as in some parts of Asia in the
early 1990s, the result may be overborrowing and ﬁnancial collapse (Rajan
and Zingales 1998).3 In this context, Rajan and Zingales (2003) suggest
that reimposing capital controls may be attractive if it enables politicians
to support the ﬁnancing of particular ﬁrms. If this view is correct, we
should expect capital controls to be associated with more resources for fa-
vored ﬁrms. In the context of economic crises, there are two testable impli-
cations at the ﬁrm level. Firms with stronger political connections should
(a) suﬀer more when a macroeconomic shock reduces the government’s
ability to provide advantages and (b) beneﬁt more when the imposition of
capital controls allows a higher level of support for particular ﬁrms.
For the macroeconomic debate, the Malaysian experience is inconclu-
sive. The capital controls worked in the sense that they were not circum-
vented on a large scale. However, they also never came under serious pres-
sure. Controls might have played a preventive role—that is, to guard
against risks to ﬁnancial stability—but they were never tested in this role.
At the same time, there is no convincing evidence of adverse macroeco-
nomic consequences from the controls.
In contrast, the ﬁrm-level evidence lends support to the Rajan and Zin-
gales view of capital controls. Our estimates indicate that in the initial
phase of the crisis, from July 1997 to August 1998, roughly 9 percent of the
estimated US$60 billion loss in market value for politically connected ﬁrms
may be attributed to the fall in the expected value of their connections.
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2. See also Perkins and Woo (2000) and Hutchison (2003).
3. Theoretically, relaxing capital controls can lead to ﬁnancial distress in at least three ways.
First, local ﬁnancial institutions respond by taking on more risk. Second, local ﬁrms borrow
directly from international lenders, who are either unable to assess risks appropriately or be-
lieve that there is an implicit sovereign guarantee. Third, after they lose their monopolies, lo-
cal banks are less willing to bail out ﬁrms that encounter problems, as in Petersen and Rajan
(1995).With the imposition of capital controls in September 1998, up to 32 per-
cent of the estimated $5 billion gain in market value for ﬁrms connected to
the prime minister may be attributed to the increase in the value of their
connections. For connected ﬁrms, the value of political connections was in
the range of 12–23 percent of their total market value at the end of Sep-
tember 1998.
The paper closest to our ﬁrm-level analysis is Fisman (2001), who esti-
mates the value of political connections in Indonesia by looking at how
stock prices moved when former president Suharto’s health was reported
to change. Fisman measures the direct eﬀect of health shocks to a dictator,
which is presumably quite speciﬁc to authoritarian systems, during a pe-
riod of relative economic stability. The Malaysian experience lets us exam-
ine the interaction of connections and capital controls in a democracy. In
addition, we are able to use variation between ﬁrms connected to politi-
cians who continue in power and those who lose out. This helps ensure that
political connections rather than some other unobservable characteristics
of ﬁrms drive our results.
Our paper is part of a growing literature that examines the performance
of relatively privileged ﬁrms. La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Zamarippa
(2003) show that well-connected Mexican banks engaged in a considerable
amount of irresponsible lending before the 1995 crisis, and this presumably
contributed to the severity of the crisis when it came. To our knowledge, no
previous papers have tried to measure the combined eﬀects of connections
and capital controls.
Our work is also related to the recent literature that shows important
links between institutions, ﬁrm-level governance, and macroeconomic out-
comes. Johnson et al. (2000) present evidence that the Asian ﬁnancial cri-
sis had more severe eﬀects in countries with weaker institutions in general
and weaker investor protection in particular (as measured by La Porta et
al. 1997, 1998). Mitton (2002) ﬁnds ﬁrm-level evidence that weaker corpo-
rate governance was associated with worse stock price performance in the
Asian crisis, and Lemmon and Lins (2003) conﬁrm these results using
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of governance and outcomes. More broadly, Morck,
Yeung, and Yu (2000) argue that in countries with weak property rights
protection, stock price movements are predominantly driven by political
shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 11.2 summarizes the history
of Malaysian capital controls.4 Section 11.3 reviews the macroeconomic
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4. Sections 11.2 and 11.3 draw on publicly available data and documents, in particular,
press releases, exchange notices, and annual reports of Bank Negara Malaysia (available at
http://www.bnm.gov.my) as well as the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions. For more details on the chronology of crisis in Malaysia and the au-
thorities’ response, see Meesook et al. (2001) and Tamirisa (2006). Section 11.4 draws on
Johnson and Mitton (2003).evidence. Section 11.4 assesses the ﬁrm-level evidence. Section 11.5 con-
cludes.
11.2 Brief Chronology of Capital Controls and Macroeconomic Policies
In 1968 Malaysia removed restrictions on payments and transfers for
current international transactions, accepting the obligations of the IMF’s
Article VIII. Exchange and capital account regulations were relaxed fur-
ther in 1973, and Malaysia moved from a ﬁxed to a ﬂoating exchange rate.
Subsequently the authorities gradually liberalized capital controls, partic-
ularly in 1986–87.5
Appendix A reports the details of Malaysian capital controls since 1992.
At the time of the Asian crisis, portfolio ﬂows were generally free of re-
strictions. Domestic and international credit transactions in foreign cur-
rency were carefully controlled, but international trade and ﬁnancial trans-
actions denominated in ringgit were allowed and perhaps even promoted.
As a result, an active and largely unregulated oﬀshore market in ringgit de-
veloped.
After Thailand devalued in July 1997, the Malaysian ringgit came under
severe pressure. Portfolio outﬂows intensiﬁed (ﬁgure 11.1), and foreign ex-
change reserves plummeted (ﬁgure 11.2). As currency traders took specu-
lative positions against the ringgit in the oﬀshore market, oﬀshore ringgit
532 Simon Johnson, Kalpana Kochhar, Todd Mitton, and Natalia Tamirisa
5. In 1994, Malaysia temporarily reintroduced some controls to stem inﬂows of short-term
capital.
Fig. 11.1 Malaysia: Cumulative and net portfolio ﬂows, 1997–2000 (in billions of
U.S. dollars)
Source: Meesook et al. (2001).interest rates rose markedly relative to onshore rates (ﬁgure 11.3). This fur-
ther intensiﬁed the movement of ringgit funds oﬀshore.
The initial response of the authorities was to tighten macroeconomic
policies.6 Spending cuts were introduced in 1997, and the 1998 budget was
drafted to target a surplus of 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
Base lending rates were allowed to rise somewhat in response to higher in-
terbank interest rates (ﬁgure 11.4), and lending targets were adjusted to re-
duce growth of credit for ﬁnancing purchases of real estate and securities.
These measures had little stabilizing impact on ﬁnancial markets as crisis
continued to spread in the region. When the extent of the output collapse be-
came clearer, by early 1998, ﬁscal policy became more expansionary. The
target for the 1998 budget was relaxed to a surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP
in March 1998. A package of measures to strengthen the ﬁnancial sector
was also introduced at the same time.
In early September 1998, arguing that the measures and reforms that
had been put in place by all countries aﬀected by the Asian crisis did not ap-
pear to be returning stability to ﬁnancial markets, the Malaysian author-
ities imposed capital controls and pegged the ringgit to the U.S. dollar.7
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Fig. 11.2 Malaysia: International reserves and exchange rate, 1995–2000
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
6. The Malaysian authorities intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market and sharply
raised interest rates in July 1997. These measures were abandoned after a few days. In August
1997, the authorities introduced limits on ringgit swap transactions with nonresidents to sta-
bilize the oﬀshore market. They also restricted trading in blue chip stocks on the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange. For more details, see Meesook et al. (2001).
7. See appendix A and Bank Negara Malaysia (1998).Toclose the oﬀshore market in ringgit and ringgit assets, investors were re-
quired to repatriate all ringgit held oﬀshore back to Malaysia, licensed
oﬀshore banks were prohibited from trading in ringgit assets, and residents
were prohibited from granting or receiving ringgit credit vis-à-vis nonresi-
dents. Among supporting measures, the authorities prohibited oﬀshore
trading of ringgit assets and brought to a halt long-standing trading in
Malaysian shares in Singapore.8 In addition to controls on international
transactions in the ringgit, the authorities imposed controls on portfolio
outﬂows, particularly a one-year holding period on nonresidents’ repatri-
ating proceeds from the sale of Malaysian securities and a prior approval
requirement—above a certain limit—for residents to transfer capital
abroad.
The controls were carefully designed to withstand pressure—that is, to
close all known channels and loopholes for the supply of the ringgit to the
oﬀshore market and major portfolio outﬂows—while attempting not to
aﬀect foreign direct investment and current account convertibility (see ap-
pendix A). The authorities also stressed the temporary nature of the con-
trols. Furthermore, a number of preconditions facilitated the implementa-
tion of capital controls—a history of using some controls, eﬀective state
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Fig. 11.3 Malaysia and Thailand: Swap diﬀerentials, May–December 1998 (swap
premia, one month forward)
Sources: Data provided by Malaysian authorities; Consensus Economics, Inc.; Asia Paciﬁc
Consensus Forecasts; and IMF staﬀ estimates.
8. The controls were gradually relaxed, beginning in December 1998. See appendix A for
more details.capacity, and generally strong bank supervision and regulation (Meesook
et al. 2001; Latifah 2002).
11.3 Macroeconomic Issues
11.3.1 Understanding the Motivation for the Controls
The authorities emphasized ﬁnancial stability as the primary motivation
for these controls. The oﬃcial press releases that accompanied the intro-
duction of capital controls underscored the following objectives: “(i) to
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Fig. 11.4 Selected Asian countries: Monetary indicators, 1998–2001: A, nominal
interest rates (percent per annum, end of period); B, real interest rate (percent 
per annum, end of period); C, private-sector credit growth (twelve-month 
percent change)
Sources: IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Asia Paciﬁc department databases.
A
B
Climit the contagion eﬀects of external developments on the Malaysian
economy; (ii) to preserve the recent gains made in terms of the policy mea-
sures to stabilize the domestic economy; and (iii) to ensure stability in do-
mestic prices and the ringgit exchange rate and create an environment that
is conducive for a revival in investor and consumer conﬁdence and facili-
tate economic recovery.”9
Although interpreting data in real time is more diﬃcult than it is ex post,
it is now clear that the risks to ﬁnancial stability in Asia had diminished by
the summer of 1998. A signiﬁcant portion of capital had already ﬂowed out
by the time the controls were imposed (ﬁgure 11.1). The ringgit had already
depreciated by 70 percent, and pressure on the currency was letting up by
the summer of 1998 (ﬁgure 11.2). Oﬀshore swap diﬀerentials for Malaysia
(as for Thailand) were trending down (ﬁgure 11.3). And quarterly GDP
growth data showed that the crisis had bottomed out in the ﬁrst quarter of
1998 (ﬁgure 11.5).
The Malaysian authorities acknowledged that the political and social
fallout from the crisis in other countries did weigh in their decision to im-
pose controls (Latifah 2002). The authorities were concerned about polit-
ical and social stability, “which deﬁned the country even more than the de-
terioration in the level of wealth” (Meesook et al. 2001). These concerns
were consistent with a worsening of political risk indicators during the
summer of 1998 (ﬁgure 11.6, where a lower score indicates higher perceived
risk), particularly following the political turmoil in Indonesia. Theoreti-
cally, in September 1998 there was a worst-case scenario of domestic capi-
tal ﬂight and increased oﬀshore speculation against the ringgit that would
have entailed signiﬁcant economic and political costs for the country. Seen
in this light, the controls played a role in guarding against the eventuality
of this scenario.
The worst-case scenario did not come to pass in September 1998.10 To a
large extent, this reﬂected increased incentives for holding the ringgit,
given the improvement in market sentiment about the region as signs of an
economic turnaround became clearer, and also the increase in global li-
quidity following cuts in U.S. interest rates. Several observers have also
noted that the ex post undervaluation of the ringgit made avoiding the
capital controls unappealing (see, for example, IMF 1999; Meesook et al.
2001; World Bank 2000; and Jeong and Mazier 2003).11
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9. See Bank Negara Malaysia (1998). The authorities considered the capital controls as
complementing the introduction of the peg, which in turn was seen as an appropriate “strate-
gic response to the unique circumstances at the time” and a way “to introduce a large degree
of stability and predictability to mitigate the impact of market volatility on the real economy”
(Latifah 2002).
10. Malaysia has turned out to be the only Asian-crisis country that did not have a govern-
ment change during 1997–98.
11. Capital controls and other measures aimed at closing the oﬀshore market prompted an
inﬂux of ringgit funds into the stock market, causing it to rally.11.3.2 Macroeconomic Impact
Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) argue that the capital controls enabled a
faster and less painful recovery in Malaysia compared with the experience
in Korea and Thailand. But their argument is based on the assumption that
Malaysia in September 1998 should be compared with other countries
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Fig. 11.5 Selected Asian countries: Real GDP growth, 1996–2001: A, quarter-on-
quarter (annualized and seasonally adjusted); B, year-on-year
Sources: IMF’s Asia Paciﬁc department databases for Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand;
Haver Analytics for Malaysia; and IMF’s International Financial Statistics.when they adopted IMF programs (six to twelve months earlier). It is hard
to make this position persuasive.
Independent of capital controls, Malaysia was well placed to experience
a shallower downturn and a faster recovery than other countries. As em-
phasized by Dornbusch (2001), initial conditions, particularly the “bur-
den” of short-term corporate debt, were more favorable in Malaysia than
in other Asian crisis countries.12 In terms of institutional indicators,
Malaysia also stands out among its regional peers, with higher rankings of
government eﬀectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption (ﬁgure 11.7).
In the event, the timing and magnitude of the output decline were simi-
lar in the four countries most seriously aﬀected by the Asia-wide crisis (In-
donesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, hereinafter referred to as crisis
countries). Hutchison’s (2003) empirical assessment leads to a similar con-
clusion. Hutchison also points out that Kaplan and Rodrik’s analysis does
not take into account the fact that the Malaysian currency crisis might not
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Fig. 11.6 Selected Asian countries: Political risk index, 1995–2002
Source: International Country Risk Guide (http://www.icrgonline.com).
12. Malaysia has had a long-standing policy of controlling external borrowing by the do-
mestic private sector. Besides prudential controls on external borrowing by banks and their
domestic lending in foreign currency, external borrowing by domestic corporations above a
certain limit required approval, which reportedly was given for projects that generated or
saved foreign currency. The authorities see this measure as helping promote “natural hedg-
ing” of private debt service payments, whereby residents borrowing externally could meet
their external (non-ringgit) obligations through their own foreign currency earnings (Latifah
2002).A
B
Fig. 11.7 Governance indicators in percentile rankings, 1998: A, Malaysia and
East Asia; B, Malaysia and upper middle-income countries
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005).
Note:The upper middle-income countries, according to World Bank’s classiﬁcation, is repre-
sented by the average value of the following group: Argentina, Belize, Botswana, Chile, Costa
Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominica, Estonia, Gabon, Grenada, Hungary, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lithuania, Mauritius, Mexico, Oman, Panama, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles,
Slovak Republic, Saint Kitts–Nevis, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela.have lasted until September 1998 if an IMF program had been in place
from 1997.
Likewise, the timing and strength of the recovery of the Malaysian econ-
omy were similar to those of the other Asian crisis countries. By the sum-
mer of 1998, all the crisis-aﬀected countries had begun to show recovery
(ﬁgure 11.5), and Malaysia recovered at about the same rate as Korea and
Thailand (the momentum of recovery in Indonesia was weaker than in the
other countries). There is thus no evidence to suggest that the Malaysian
economy performed better than the others following the imposition of the
controls. This is not surprising, given that Malaysia’s macroeconomic poli-
cies were broadly similar to those in other crisis countries.
Some commentators argued that the controls could be used to allow
the government to undertake expansionary ﬁscal and monetary policy
without fear of worsening external imbalances (e.g., Perkins and Woo
2000). However, the evidence shows that the Malaysian authorities did
not use controls to pursue heterodox policies such as a substantial low-
ering of interest rates or providing a particularly aggressive ﬁscal stimu-
lus. In the event, the timing and pace of interest rate reductions in
Malaysia were not out of line with those in the other crisis countries,
where there were no capital controls (ﬁgure 11.4). A comparison with
Korea is particularly instructive in this context. In nominal terms, inter-
est rates in Korea and Malaysia were similar during the period in ques-
tion. But in real terms, interest rates were brought down earlier and more
aggressively in Korea: by the summer of 1998, they were already below
those in Malaysia, and remained below after the controls were imposed.
Moreover, the ﬁscal impulse provided in Malaysia was smaller than in
other crisis countries in 1998 and broadly similar in 1999 (ﬁgure 11.8and
Meesook et al. 2001).13 The current account surplus and increases in re-
serves during the recovery stage were larger in Malaysia than in other
countries, in part reﬂecting the undervaluation of the ringgit. Through-
out the crisis and into the capital control period the authorities pursued
what are generally considered to be orthodox macroeconomic and struc-
tural policies.
All in all, there is no evidence in the data to suggest that capital controls
made a visible diﬀerence in Malaysia’s recovery process. Responsible macro-
economic policies and commitment to ﬁnancial- and corporate-sector
reforms, together with strong initial conditions and institutional capacity,
should receive the main credit for the recovery in Malaysia.14As the experi-
ence of other crisis countries shows, these policies were possible with-
out capital controls.
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13. The ﬁscal impulse was larger in 2000, but by this time controls had been signiﬁcantly
relaxed.
14. See Lindgren et al. (1999), Meesook et al. (2001), and Latifah (2002) for a detailed dis-
cussion of structural reforms in Malaysia during and after the crisis.At the same time, there is no evidence that controls had lasting costs by
aﬀecting Malaysia’s access to international portfolio capital. While Thai-
land, Korea, and Indonesia also suﬀered lower investor ratings after the
crisis hit, Malaysia suﬀered a particularly steep fall from 1998 to 1999. But
by 2003, all four countries had regained their previous relative rankings.
Three of the countries had slightly lower absolute rankings than before—
only Indonesia was much lower. Malaysia’s spreads widened by more than
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A
Fig. 11.8 Asian countries: Fiscal indicators, 1995–2000 (percent of GDP): 
A, overall ﬁscal balance; B, cumulative ﬁscal impulse
Source: Meesook et al. (2001).
Note: In panel B, Thailand is on a ﬁscal-year basis, where the ﬁscal year ends in September.
Bthose of other countries after capital controls were introduced, but these
eﬀects unwound relatively rapidly.
One open question is whether there is any evidence that, after the capital
controls, investors perceived Malaysia as a less desirable destination for for-
eign direct investment (FDI). According to the 2004 United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) annual report on FDI,
Malaysia has maintained a steady ranking (around 33rd–34th in the world)
in terms of FDI “potential” (measured on the basis of “structural factors”
such as physical infrastructure, GDP per capita, total exports and imports
of natural resources, education, energy use, and the stock of FDI), but in
terms of capital attracted it has slipped from around 5th–10th in the world
before the crisis to 70th–75th after the crisis. Other Asian countries aﬀected
by the crisis—with the exception of Indonesia—did not experience similarly
sharp falls in actual inward FDI performance, as assessed by UNCTAD.
In addition, the recovery in Malaysia’s private ﬁxed investment has been
slower than in other crisis countries (ﬁgure 11.9). The decline from high
precrisis levels is consistent with the view that these countries were invest-
ing too much in the early and mid-1990s. While we do not yet have enough
data to draw deﬁnite conclusions, it is striking that Korea, Thailand, and
Indonesia have all shown a stronger recovery in private investment than
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Fig. 11.9 Selected Asian countries: Private ﬁxed investment, 1990–2004 (private
gross ﬁxed capital formation as percent of GDP)
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook Database; for Korea, OECD database.
Note: Observations for Indonesia before 1999 are estimated on the assumption that the ratio
of private to public ﬁxed investment is constant and equal to its average for the period 1999–
2004.has Malaysia. Private investment, as a percent of GDP, has recently been
remarkably low—under 10 percent—in Malaysia, and only about half the
regional average.
11.4 Firm-Level Evidence
11.4.1 Political Connections in Malaysia
Gomez and Jomo (1997) suggest there were two forms of political con-
nections in Malaysia prior to 1997. The ﬁrst is the oﬃcial status awarded
to ﬁrms that are run by ethnic Malays. The second consists of much more
informal ties that exist between leading politicians and ﬁrms that are run
by both Malay and Chinese businesspeople.
Although ethnic Malays (known as Bumiputras, literally “sons of the
soil”) account for some 60 percent of the population, business in Malaysia
has historically been dominated by ethnic Chinese. With an eye toward
correcting this imbalance, and partly in response to ethnic rioting in 1969,
the government instituted the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970. Since
that time, Bumiputras have been given, among other privileges, priority for
government contracts, increased access to capital, opportunities to buy
assets that are privatized, and other subsidies. The ruling coalition in
Malaysia for over three decades has been the Barisan Nasional, which is
dominated by the United Malays’ National Organisation (UMNO). Dr.
Mahathir bin Mohamad, president of UMNO and prime minister of
Malaysia from 1981 to 2003, consistently promoted Bumiputra capitalism
(Gomez and Jomo 1997).
The increased state intervention required for implementation of the
NEP opened the door to greater political involvement in the ﬁnancing of
ﬁrms in Malaysia. During the 1990s, two government oﬃcials were most
inﬂuential in promoting ﬁrms in Malaysia. The ﬁrst was the prime minis-
ter. The second was Anwar Ibrahim, ﬁnance minister during the Asian cri-
sis.15 Below we denote the ﬁrst type of ﬁrm as PMC (prime minister con-
nected) and the second type as FMC (ﬁnance minister connected).
11.4.2 Identifying Firm-Level Political Connections
To identify which ﬁrms have political connections with government oﬃ-
cials, we rely on the analysis of Gomez and Jomo (1997). This analysis has
Malaysian Capital Controls 543
15. Before moving on to the coding of political connections, it is important to note that
there is no evidence suggesting that any unobserved characteristics of these ﬁrms determined
their political aﬃliations. Before the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the evidence suggests that aﬃlia-
tions to either the ﬁnance minister or the prime minister were close substitutes. Indeed, there
is no evidence that the alliances between ﬁrms and speciﬁc politicians were the result of any-
thing other than chance personal relationships (Gomez and Jomo 1997, pp. 126, 148–49).
Any systematic diﬀerences in the performance of these ﬁrms should therefore be due to the
changing relative value of their political connections.been used extensively to identify political connections in Malaysia in pre-
vious work, including Johnson and Mitton (2003), Faccio (2006), Faccio,
Masulis, and McConnell (2006), and Chong, Liu, and Tan (2005).
Using the analysis of Gomez and Jomo (1997) to identify connections
creates some limitations. First, these authors do not claim to have exhaus-
tively identiﬁed every ﬁrm with political connections in Malaysia. Second,
although all connections identiﬁed by Gomez and Jomo (1997) are from
before the Asian crisis, some are identiﬁed from earlier in the 1990s, creat-
ing the possibility that a connection could have disappeared prior to the
beginning of the crisis.16 However, given the relative stability of the gov-
ernment over this period, it seems unlikely that changes in political con-
nections would be prevalent during this period. Many political connec-
tions identiﬁed by Gomez and Jomo are unoﬃcial and have not been
veriﬁed by other sources. Finally, the coding of political connections does
not measure the strength of these connections. Nevertheless, Gomez and
Jomo oﬀer an extensive analysis, and we take a systematic approach to
identifying connections based on their work. Consequently, our coding of
connections likely presents a fairly clear picture of investors’ perceptions
of political connections during this time period. See appendix B for more
details and examples of our coding.
11.4.3 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Our sample is taken from the set of Malaysian ﬁrms in the Worldscope
database. Worldscope maintains data on active and inactive ﬁrms, so there
is no sample selection bias due to ﬁrms dropping out of the data set. The
ﬁrms in our sample are representative of the ﬁrms listed on the main board
of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Firms not included in our sample
include smaller unlisted Malaysian ﬁrms and multinationals with no local
listing.
Table 11.1 reports the basic descriptive data for these ﬁrms. In this table
we compare the performance of politically connected ﬁrms to that of un-
connected ﬁrms prior to the crisis. We deﬁne political connections for each
ﬁrm in our sample as outlined in the previous section. Table 11.1 also com-
pares the performance of PMC ﬁrms to FMC ﬁrms, and shows the perfor-
mance of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms separately. Row 1 reports the number of ﬁrms
in each category of our sample; the total number of ﬁrms with available
precrisis data is 424, of which 67 had identiﬁable political connections.
Row 2 of table 11.1 shows that politically connected ﬁrms had signiﬁ-
cantly worse returns (compared with unconnected ﬁrms) during the crisis
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16. In the second edition of their book, which was prepared in late 1997 and appeared in
1998, Gomez and Jomo (1998) updated their list of political connections. We have used this
revised list as a robustness check and ﬁnd that it does not aﬀect any of our main results. How-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.period of July 1997 to August 1998, although there was no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between PMC and FMC ﬁrms. Row 3 shows that politically
connected ﬁrms had signiﬁcantly better returns (compared with uncon-
nected ﬁrms) after the imposition of capital controls in September 1998,
and that PMC ﬁrms performed much better than FMC ﬁrms during this
period. Row 4 shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between politically con-
nected and unconnected ﬁrms in returns after September 1998.
Row 5 of table 11.1 shows that, in terms of total assets, politically con-
nected ﬁrms were signiﬁcantly larger than unconnected ﬁrms (about twice
the size on average), although asset growth immediately before the crisis
was not signiﬁcantly greater in connected ﬁrms (row 6). There is no evi-
dence that PMC ﬁrms had larger size on average than FMC ﬁrms.
Row 7 of table 11.1 suggests that politically connected ﬁrms were less
proﬁtable than unconnected ﬁrms (in terms of return on assets) before the
crisis.17 However, in regression analysis (not reported here but available on
request) we control for other ﬁrm characteristics, such as ﬁrm size and in-
dustry, and ﬁnd no evidence that politically connected ﬁrms had lower
proﬁtability before the crisis (Johnson and Mitton 2003).18 Rows 8 and 9
show no diﬀerences in the liquidity (current ratio) and eﬃciency (asset
turnover ratio), respectively, across the dimensions of political connections
(in terms of t-tests of the means). The book-market ratio is one way to ex-
amine whether investors perceive that there is expropriation of assets by
managers or controlling shareholders. Row 10 shows that these ratios are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for any group of ﬁrms before the crisis.
In the next section of table 11.1 we examine the ﬁnancial leverage of
ﬁrms prior to the crisis period. If politically connected ﬁrms had greater
leverage prior to the crisis, then this could explain some or all of the per-
formance diﬀerences in stock price performance. A ﬁrm with higher debt
would naturally be expected to perform worse in a crisis (compared to a
ﬁrm with less debt) both because of the eﬀect of leverage on a ﬁrm’s co-
variation with the market and also because the depreciation of the local
currency hurts a ﬁrm if any of its debt is denominated in foreign currency.
In addition, if the government responds to the crisis by raising interest
rates—as in Malaysia early in the crisis—this raises the cost of servicing
corporate debt. The data on leverage in table 11.1 show that ﬁrms with po-
litical connections had debt-asset ratios more than 11 percentage points
higher, on average, than unconnected ﬁrms prior to the crisis (row 11). In
addition, leverage was rising signiﬁcantly faster for connected ﬁrms prior
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17. This is consistent with the notion that politically connected ﬁrms were not well run,
at least with respect to performance reported in audited statements (as opposed to private
beneﬁts).
18. Using data through 1995, fewer ﬁrms, and a diﬀerent speciﬁcation, Samad (n.d.) ﬁnds
that politically connected ﬁrms have higher proﬁtability but no diﬀerence in investment be-
havior.to the crisis (row 12). However, politically connected ﬁrms had less short-
term debt (maturity less than one year) as a percentage of total debt (row
13), and connected ﬁrms had a lower percentage increase in short-term
debt prior to the crisis (row 14). These apparent diﬀerences in leverage be-
tween connected and unconnected ﬁrms are only rough measures, of
course, in that they do not account for diﬀerences in industry or other ﬁrm
characteristics.
In further regression analysis (not reported here but available on re-
quest) we control for other factors, and we still ﬁnd that politically con-
nected ﬁrms had more debt before the crisis (see Johnson and Mitton
2003). Controlling for standard determinants of leverage—size, proﬁtabil-
ity, growth, and industry—accounts for some, but not all, of the diﬀerence
in leverage between favored and other ﬁrms.19After controlling for all these
factors, among nonﬁnancial ﬁrms politically connected ﬁrms still had debt
ratios 5 percentage points higher (with the coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level).
Overall, the evidence in table 11.1 does not suggest that favored ﬁrms
performed diﬀerently during the crisis primarily because they were oper-
ated any better or worse (than unconnected ﬁrms) before the crisis. How-
ever, size and leverage stand out as the primary characteristics that diﬀer
between connected and unconnected ﬁrms, and we will control for these
characteristics in subsequent regression analysis.
11.4.4 Hypotheses and Regression Speciﬁcation
We now turn to analysis of ﬁrm-level performance of connected ﬁrms
relative to unconnected ﬁrms during the crisis period and imposition of
capital controls. Note that the nature of the data does not let us distinguish
the market perception of the capital controls separately from other events
that took place at the same time and were associated with the imposition
of these controls.
If political connections mattered in Malaysia, then the Rajan and Zin-
gales view suggests three speciﬁc hypotheses:
• The stock price of politically connected ﬁrms should have fallen more
in the early crisis period.
• When capital controls were imposed, the stock price of politically con-
nected ﬁrms should have risen (relative to unconnected ﬁrms). Within
the set of politically connected ﬁrms, the beneﬁts of capital controls
should be concentrated in PMC ﬁrms rather than FMC ﬁrms in Sep-
tember 1998.
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19. Speciﬁcally, larger ﬁrms had higher debt ratios, as predicted by Titman and Wessels
(1988); more-proﬁtable ﬁrms had lower debt ratios, as suggested by Myers (1977); and ﬁrms
with higher growth had higher debt ratios.• After the imposition of capital controls, PMC ﬁrms should have
shown some evidence of having received advantages.
We examine the evidence for each of these hypotheses in turn. We begin
by assessing the impact of political connections on stock price perfor-
mance during the crisis period and after the imposition of capital controls.
Because we use monthly stock return data, we deﬁne the “crisis period” as
July 1997 through August 1998.20
Other studies have focused on September 1998 as a key date in the Ma-
laysian crisis.21 The most detailed account of Malaysia’s economic crisis,
by Jomo (2001, chap. 7), also identiﬁes the beginning of September 1998as
the critical turning point. Returns for the month of September 1998 are
used to assess the stock price impact of capital controls.
To study stock price performance, we estimate the following cross-
sectional return model:
(1) Stock returni    Political connectioni   Sizei   Leveragei
  Industryi  εi,
where the stock return for ﬁrm i is measured over a speciﬁed period. Stock
returns are dividend inclusive and expressed in ringgit.22 The political con-
nection variables change according to the speciﬁcation. Equation (1) also
shows that we control for other factors that may inﬂuence returns; in par-
ticular, we control for those factors for which diﬀerences were demon-
strated between connected and unconnected ﬁrms in table 11.1 Sizei and
Leveragei for each ﬁrm i are as deﬁned in table 11.1, and Industryi corre-
sponds to a set of dummy variables corresponding to the primary industry
of ﬁrm i, where industries are deﬁned broadly, as in Campbell (1996).
11.4.5 The Crisis Period: July 1997–August 1998
Table 11.2presents the results from these regressions for the period from
July 1997 to August 1998. In the ﬁrst three columns, the politically con-
nected dummy variable is included. For nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, the coeﬃcient
on the politically connected dummy is –0.075, indicating that a political
connection is associated with a greater stock price decline of 7.5 percent-
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20. The beginning of the crisis period corresponds to the devaluation of the Thai baht on
July 2, 1997, a date generally considered to be the starting point of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis.
The end of the crisis period and start of the “rebound period” corresponds to the imposition
of capital controls on September 2, 1998, when the stock index began a sustained upward
trend.
21. Capital controls were announced on September 1, and the ringgit-dollar rate was ﬁxed
in the early afternoon of September 2, 1998.
22. We do not calculate abnormal returns using historical betas because data limitations
prevent calculation of precrisis betas for many of the ﬁrms in the sample. Even requiring a
price history of just twenty-four months, we can calculate betas for only 65 percent of the
ﬁrms in our sample. In this subsample, all of our key results are robust to including beta in the
regressions.age points, on average, during the crisis period of July 1997 through Au-
gust 1998.23 For ﬁnancial ﬁrms, the coeﬃcient is similar, at –0.077. These
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level of conﬁdence. The control
variables for size and leverage are also signiﬁcant in these regressions, with
larger size being associated with higher returns during the crisis, and
higher leverage with lower returns.
In the last three columns, we include separate dummies for PMC and
FMC. Both types of politically connected ﬁrms had worse stock price per-
formance than did unconnected ﬁrms, but the diﬀerence in performance
between PMC and FMC ﬁrms is small in this time period. Among nonﬁ-
nancial ﬁrms, PMC ﬁrms had a greater decline of 7.9 percentage points,
and FMC ﬁrms had a greater decline of 5.9 percentage points.
Note that, depending on the precise speciﬁcation, as many as six of the
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Table 11.2 Political connections and crisis-period stock returns (dependent variables: stock
return from July 1997 to August 1998)
Political connections PM and FM connections
Nonﬁnancial Financial  All  Nonﬁnancial Financial  All 
ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms
Politically connected –0.075∗∗∗ –0.077∗∗∗ –0.077∗∗∗
(–2.97) (–3.42) (–3.88)
PM connected –0.079∗∗∗ –0.091∗∗∗ –0.083∗∗∗
(–2.78) (–3.58) (–3.64)
FM connected –0.059 –0.046 –0.056∗∗
(–1.61) (–1.34) (–2.06)
Firm size 0.074∗∗∗ 0.041∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(5.19) (1.71) (5.56) (5.19) (1.75) (5.56)
Debt ratio –0.0014∗ –0.0011 –0.0014∗∗ –0.0014∗ –0.0010 –0.0014∗∗
(–1.87) (–1.65) (–2.10) (–1.85) (–1.53) (–2.07)
No. of observations 312 112 424 312 112 424
R-squared 0.269 0.095 0.236 0.269 0.099 0.237
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcient estimates from regressions of stock returns on political connection
variables and control variables over the Asian crisis period of July 1997 to August 1998. All Malaysian
ﬁrms with available data in the Worldscope database are included. Also estimated but not reported are
a constant term and industry dummy variables. “Politically connected” means the ﬁrm has an identiﬁ-
able connection with key government oﬃcials from Gomez and Jomo (1997). “PM connected” and “FM
connected” indicate the source of the political connection to prime minister and ﬁnance minister, re-
spectively, as in Gomez and Jomo (1997). Firm size is measured as the log of total assets; the debt ratio
is measured as total debt over total assets. Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust t-
statistics.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
23. See table 11.1 for average declines in stock price: 83 percent for connected ﬁrms and
77.7 percent for unconnected ﬁrms in this ﬁrst phase of the crisis.twelve industry dummies are signiﬁcant in our crisis-period regressions.24
However, including industry dummies does not weaken the coeﬃcients on
the political connection variables.
In the ﬁrst phase of the ﬁnancial crisis, therefore, political connections
were associated with a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the stock price perfor-
mance of Malaysian ﬁrms (although the total decline in all stock prices was
larger than the connection-speciﬁc eﬀect). This is broadly consistent with the
Rajan and Zingales (1998) view that ﬁrms with strong political connections
suﬀer more in a ﬁnancial crisis, presumably because the expected value of
government support declines. It is hard to know exactly what the Malaysian
government was doing with regard to such support in 1997–98, but the ﬁ-
nance minister’s stated policy was to follow tight budget discipline along the
lines of a de facto IMF program (although Malaysia did not sign up for oﬃ-
cial IMF conditionality). There was also a certain amount of political rhet-
oric regarding the need to reduce cronyism (and various statements from
both the ﬁnance minister and the prime minister about who was or was not
a “crony”). Our results indicate that the market interpreted the policies of
July 1997 to August 1998 as squeezing politically connected ﬁrms.25
11.4.6 The Eﬀects of Capital Controls: September 1998
If politically connected ﬁrms performed poorly during the ﬁrst phase of
the crisis because the connections themselves decreased in value, then con-
nected ﬁrms should rebound more than unconnected ﬁrms when capital
controls were imposed. (Again, we are measuring not the eﬀects of the con-
trols alone, but rather the market’s view—which may have been incor-
rect—of all the events associated with the controls.)
In general, it could be diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate a rebound based on polit-
ical connections from a rebound based on operating characteristics of
ﬁrms. But Malaysian political events allow for a cleaner test. September
1998 marked both the imposition of capital controls and also the downfall
of the ﬁnance minister. Once considered the prime minister’s certain suc-
cessor, the ﬁnance minister was ﬁred on September 2, 1998, and then jailed
on charges of corruption on September 20, 1998. Over the course of Sep-
tember 1998, investors’ perceptions were that these events reduced the
value of political connections for ﬁrms with strong ties to the ﬁnance min-
ister. To the extent that politically connected ﬁrms enjoyed a rebound in
September due to the increased value of their connections, investors would
not expect the same increase in value to be enjoyed by FMC ﬁrms.
Table 11.3 presents the results of regressions of stock returns for Sep-
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24. Following Campbell (1996, table 1) the industries are petroleum, ﬁnance/real estate,
consumer durables, basic industry, food/tobacco, construction, capital goods, transporta-
tion, utilities, textiles/trade, services, and leisure.
25. We have performed a number of robustness tests on these results that are not reported
here but are discussed in Johnson and Mitton (2003). In particular, the regression results are
robust to controlling for political favoritism of Bumiputra ﬁrms.tember 1998 on the same variables as in table 11.2. The ﬁrst three columns
present results for the political connections indicator. Politically connected
ﬁrms as a whole enjoyed a rebound in September 1998 (their total increase
in average stock price was 53.2 percent, compared with 37.1 percent for un-
connected ﬁrms; see table 11.1). Among nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, a higher return
of 8.1 percentage points, not signiﬁcant at standard levels, may be attrib-
uted to political connections. The eﬀect appears to be stronger among ﬁ-
nancial ﬁrms, where connected ﬁrms on average had a higher return of 28.5
percentage points, which is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. For all ﬁrms
combined, the political connections coeﬃcient shows a higher return of
13.8 percentage points, and is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
The ﬁnal three columns of table 11.3 present results for the diﬀerences in
PMC and FMC ﬁrms. Among nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, PMC ﬁrms on average
experienced higher returns of 13 percentage points, signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level, while the dummy on FMC ﬁrms is –11.6 percentage points
(but is not statistically signiﬁcant), for a total net diﬀerence of 24.6 per-
centage points (13 plus 11.6) between PMC and FMC ﬁrms. The eﬀect
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Table 11.3 Political connections and stock returns following the imposition of capital controls
(dependent variable: stock return for September 1998)
Political connections PM and FM connections
Nonﬁnancial Financial  All  Nonﬁnancial Financial  All 
ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms
Politically connected 0.081 0.285∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗
(1.23) (2.69) (2.42)
PM connected 0.130∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(1.76) (3.02) (2.98)
FM connected –0.116 0.027 –0.063
(–1.11) (0.24) (–0.81)
Firm size 0.014 –0.038 0.001 0.015 –0.043 0.000
(0.42) (–0.50) (0.04) (0.43) (–0.58) (0.01)
Debt ratio 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0018 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0012 0.0031∗∗∗
(3.48) (0.89) (3.53) (3.40) (0.58) (3.35)
No. of observations 302 111 413 302 111 413
R-squared 0.142 0.115 0.128 0.154 0.153 0.143
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcient estimates from regressions of stock returns on political connection
variables and control variables for September 1998. All Malaysian ﬁrms with available data in the World-
scope database are included. Also estimated but not reported are a constant term and industry dummy
variables. “Politically connected” means the ﬁrm has an identiﬁable connection with key government
oﬃcials from Gomez and Jomo (1997). “PM connected” and “FM connected” indicate the source of the
political connection to prime minister and ﬁnance minister, respectively, as in Gomez and Jomo (1997).
Firm size is measured as the log of total assets; the debt ratio is measured as total debt over total assets.
Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.seems even stronger among ﬁnancial ﬁrms, where PMC ﬁrms had higher re-
turns of 40.3 percentage points, signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Among all
ﬁrms combined, PMC ﬁrms on average had higher returns of 19.9 percent-
age points, signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, while FMC ﬁrms on average
had lower returns of 6.3 percentage points (not statistically signiﬁcant).
This result suggests that the value of political connections themselves was
an important determinant of the fortunes of Malaysian ﬁrms when capital
controls were imposed.
As a further test of whether the observed diﬀerences are due to the
eﬀects of capital controls, we examine cross-sectional diﬀerences in stock
price gains following the imposition of capital controls. If capital controls
constrain ﬁnancial ﬂows across borders, we would expect to see smaller
gains for connected ﬁrms having access to international capital markets
compared to connected ﬁrms without such access. In additional regres-
sions (not reported here, but see Johnson and Mitton 2003) we compare
gains for connected ﬁrms that had foreign capital access (deﬁned as having
international stock listings or bond placements) with connected ﬁrms that
did not have foreign capital access. While the evidence is mixed at times, on
balance the results show that politically connected ﬁrms without foreign
capital access performed better than connected ﬁrms with foreign capital
access when capital controls were imposed (Johnson and Mitton 2003).26
The results are consistent with the idea that capital controls aﬀected
Malaysian ﬁrms’ access to foreign ﬁnance.
11.4.7 Economic Signiﬁcance of Political Connections
For a measure of economic signiﬁcance, we use our regression coeﬃ-
cients to estimate the impact of connections on the total market value of
ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that during the crisis period, roughly $5.7 billion of the to-
tal market value lost by connected ﬁrms is attributable to their political
connections. When capital controls were imposed in September 1998, al-
though market valuations were then on a smaller scale, political connec-
tions are estimated to have accounted for an incremental gain of roughly
$1.3 billion in market value for connected ﬁrms.27
By looking at the outcomes for connected ﬁrms in September 1998, we
can obtain an estimate of the perceived value of political connections as a
percentage of total ﬁrm value after capital controls were imposed. If we as-
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26. Our results are weakest when we limit the sample to just ﬁrms that were included in the
International Finance Corporation’s investable index (i.e., those regarded as being more liq-
uid). In this case, the coeﬃcient on prime minister connections falls to 0.129, with a t-statistic
of 1.1. However, this sample is only 109 ﬁrms, which is about one-quarter of our main sample,
so the loss of signiﬁcance is not surprising.
27. The estimates of the eﬀects of political connections on market value are based on our
estimated regression coeﬃcients, monthly stock prices, and available data on the number of
shares outstanding for each ﬁrm. Because the number of shares outstanding is not known for
every month and is missing for three of the connected ﬁrms, the estimated ﬁgures are not ex-
act calculations but reasonable estimates.sume that the events of September 1998 restored the full value of connec-
tions to the prime minister, then the estimated gain attributable to prime
minister connections in September 1998 should give an indication of the
percentage of ﬁrm value attributable to political connections. Our regres-
sion coeﬃcients show that prime minister connections account for about a
20 percent increase in ﬁrm value in September 1998. In terms of (higher)
valuations at the end of September 1998, this increase would be 12 percent
of ﬁrm value. This would suggest that 12 percent is a low estimate of in-
vestors’ perceptions of the percentage of ﬁrm value attributable to con-
nections, with the actual percentage being higher to the extent that con-
nections still accounted for some value prior to September 1998. While this
is clearly only a rough estimate, the estimated proportion of value attrib-
utable to connections seems to be within the 12–23 percent range estimated
by Fisman (2001) for connected ﬁrms in Indonesia.
Regarding the eﬀect of political connections in relation to the total vari-
ation in returns, we note that in regressions with September 1998 returns,
the R-squared of the regression rises incrementally from 0.109 to 0.143
when the political connection variables are added. This suggests that
roughly 3.4 percent of the total variation in returns is explained by diﬀer-
ences in political connections (alternatively, about one-quarter of the sys-
tematic, explainable variation in stock prices is due to political connec-
tions). For regressions of returns for the initial crisis period, adding
political connection variables increases the R-squared from 0.210 to 0.237,
suggesting that 2.7 percent of the total variation in returns is explained by
diﬀerences in political connections.
11.4.8 After the Imposition of Capital Controls: 1999–2003
What did the Malaysian government do once capital controls were im-
posed? Some general reﬂationary measures were taken, including cutting
interest rates and making credit more readily available to consumers and
ﬁrms (Kaplan and Rodrik 2001; Mahathir 2000, chap. 8). A new expan-
sionary budget was introduced in October 1998 (Perkins and Woo 2000).
Overall, however, as discussed above, macroeconomic policy remained
cautious and responsible after the controls were imposed.
At the ﬁrm level, evidence from the public record suggests that the gov-
ernment may have used the economy’s isolation from short-term capital
ﬂows to restore advantages for some favored ﬁrms. The precise distribution
of these advantages is hard to measure, as they are usually not reported
publicly. However, high-proﬁle incidents that have been reported in the in-
ternational media suggest three types of beneﬁts for favored ﬁrms.28
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28. These three forms of advantages for favored ﬁrms could beneﬁt minority shareholders,
in part because they put the supported ﬁrms on a stronger ﬁnancial basis and reduce the in-
centives to transfer resources out of the ﬁrms (Johnson et al. 2000). In other cases, however,
the government has permitted companies to carry out actions that might be detrimental to
minority shareholders (see, e.g., Restall 2000b; Perkins and Woo 2000; Jayasankaran 2000).First, the state-owned oil company was called upon to provide bailouts
to particular distressed ﬁrms (see, e.g., Jayasankaran 1999b; Restall 2000a;
Lopez 2001).29 Second, some companies with perceived political connec-
tions appeared to receive advantageous deals directly from the government
(see, e.g., Prystay 2000).30 Third, in the banking sector, the government in-
troduced a consolidation plan that appeared beneﬁcial to connected ﬁrms,
and some large companies were allowed to repeatedly roll over their debts
(see, e.g., Jayasankaran 1999a; Dhume et al. 2001).31
While these extracts from the public record provide anecdotal evidence
that certain ﬁrms were favored after the imposition of capital controls, it is
impossible to directly measure the extent to which connected ﬁrms re-
ceived beneﬁts. In order to address the issue more systematically, we turn
again to the ﬁrm-level data. Speciﬁcally, we examine the operating perfor-
mance of all Malaysian ﬁrms in Worldscope over the period 1990–2003.
We study four ﬁrm-level measures of operating performance: investment,
growth, proﬁtability, and leverage. Here we deﬁne investment as the ratio
of capital expenditures to gross ﬁxed assets, growth as the log annual
growth rate in sales, proﬁtability as the return on assets, and leverage as the
ratio of total debt to total assets.
In table 11.4, we show the median ﬁrm-level operating performance for
each of these measures for each year from 1990 to 2003. To assess the eﬀect
of having political connections in each year, we also show the results of re-
gressing these performance measures on a full set of two-digit standard in-
dustrial classiﬁcation (SIC) sector dummy variables, a control for ﬁrm size,
and a dummy for whether a ﬁrm was, according to Gomez and Jomo
(1997), connected to the prime minister. Each year is covered in a separate
regression.
The results in table 11.4 indicate that PMC ﬁrms showed higher invest-
ment, higher growth, higher leverage, and lower proﬁtability in most pre-
crisis years (compared with non-PMC ﬁrms). However, in the years fol-
lowing the crisis, the diﬀerences in investment and growth were largely
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29. “Since the Asian ﬁnancial crisis hit, Petronas has helped buy debt-burdened shipping
assets controlled by Mahathir’s eldest son; now it’s preparing to buy control of the national
car maker, Proton. Looking ahead, Mahathir told the Review in June that he didn’t see why
Petronas should not take over the ailing national carrier, Malaysian Airlines, although
Petronas itself says it has no such plan” (Jayasankaran 1999b).
30. “On Friday, the government announced it will raise six billion ringgit [$1.58 billion] in
a bond issue to buy back the assets of two unproﬁtable privatized light-rail projects in Kuala
Lumpur. Two key beneﬁciaries of the bailout: debt-laden conglomerate Renong Bhd., which
owns one of the rail projects, and Renong’s controlling shareholder, Halim Saad. The move
comes days after the Finance Ministry agreed to repurchase a 29 percent interest in ailing
Malaysian Airlines System from businessman Tajudin Ramli for 1.79 billion ringgit—the
same price he paid the government for the MAS stake in 1994” (Prystay 2000).
31. “A major worry is that the government seems to have weighed political ties in choosing
some of the leader banks....  J ust as there are losers in the merger stakes, so are there win-
ners. One of them is Multipurpose Bank, a small institution controlled by businessmen widely











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.reversed: the PMC ﬁrms had lower investment and growth. In addition, in
the years following the crisis, PMC ﬁrms appear to have had even higher
leverage than other ﬁrms compared with the years before the crisis. On bal-
ance, the results show that the eﬀects of being connected to the prime min-
ister, in terms of ﬁrm operating performance, were very diﬀerent after the
imposition of capital controls from what they were prior to the crisis.
To further assess the operating performance of connected ﬁrms, in panel
A of table 11.5, we estimate the following panel regression:
(2) Performanceit    Firmi   PMCi   Crisist   PMCi   Postcrisist
  Yeart   εit,
where Performanceit is one of the four measures of operating performance
for ﬁrm i in year t. Firmi represents ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. PMCi is a dummy
variable indicating whether ﬁrm iis connected to the prime minister. As we
have a full set of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, we cannot estimate the direct PMC
eﬀect, but this framework allows us to look at how the eﬀects of connec-
tions varied over time. Crisist is a dummy variable set to 1 for years 1997–
98, and Postcrisist is a dummy variable set to 1 for years 1999–2003. Yeart
represents a full set of year-speciﬁc dummy variables.
These results show that, compared with unconnected ﬁrms, PMC ﬁrms
suﬀered a large drop in relative investment and growth from the precrisis
to postcrisis period. They also had less growth and higher leverage, relative
to unconnected ﬁrms, in the crisis period compared with the precrisis pe-
riod. The eﬀects in question are large and consistent with the data shown
in table 11.4.32
However, it is possible that the standard errors in panel A of table 11.5
are too low—for example, if there is serial correlation in the error term. As
a more conservative approach, in panels B, C, and D we estimate the fol-
lowing cross-sectional regression:
(3) AvgPerformancei    PMCi   Industryi   εi,
where AvgPerformanceiis the average of one of the four performance mea-
sures over all years in the precrisis period (panel B), the crisis period (panel
C), or the postcrisis period (panel D). PMCi is a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether ﬁrm i is connected to the prime minister. Industryi represents
a full set of industry dummy variables.33
In addition, panel A of table 11.5 shows the value of prime minister con-
nections after the crisis relative to before (or during) the crisis. Panels B, C,
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32. We obtain similar results for investment, leverage, and proﬁtability using Arellano-
Bond generalized method of moments (GMM). A balanced panel also gives similar results,
although the standard errors are higher because the sample is much smaller (about 20 percent
of the full sample).
33. The only diﬀerence between the regression in table 11.4 and the one in panels B, C, and
D of table 11.5 is that table 11.4 also includes a control for ﬁrm size.and D show the PMC versus unconnected (non-PMC) comparison within
each time period, which enables us also to check the absolute value of these
connections. PMC ﬁrms had a growth advantage in the precrisis period,
and this disappeared after the crisis.34These connected ﬁrms also had more
leverage and less proﬁtability during the crisis. Taken with the rest of table
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Table 11.5 Political connections and operating performance: Regression analysis
Investment Growth Leverage Proﬁtability
A. 1990–2003 (dependent variable: the performance measure indicated)
PM connected   crisis 0.001 –0.128∗ 0.232∗ –0.075
(0.02) (–1.67) (1.92) (–1.04)
PM connected   postcrisis –0.050∗ –0.213∗∗∗ 0.210 –0.003
(–1.93) (–2.91) (1.46) (–0.11)
No. of observations 3,035 3,557 3,786 3,792
R-squared 0.312 0.196 0.538 0.176
B. Precrisis period (dependent variable: the average performance measure over period)
PM connected 0.048 0.264∗∗ 0.049 –0.009
(1.27) (2.50) (1.62) (–0.74)
No. of observations 279 263 324 324
R-squared 0.174 0.680 0.244 0.195
C. Crisis period (dependent variable: the average performance measure over period)
PM connected 0.053 0.022 0.287∗∗ –0.131∗
(1.49) (0.38) (2.27) (–1.70)
No. of observations 283 347 355 355
R-squared 0.173 0.258 0.195 0.123
D. Postcrisis period (dependent variable: the average performance measure over period)
PM connected 0.008 –0.013 0.241 0.012
(0.74) (–0.16) (1.38) (0.33)
No. of observations 287 354 355 355
R-squared 0.162 0.149 0.166 0.155
Notes:Panel A reports coeﬃcient estimates from panel regressions of performance measures
on a political connection indicator over the period 1990 to 2003. Panel A includes ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects and a full set of year-speciﬁc dummies are included. Panels B, C, and D regress aver-
age performance measures over the given time period on the political connections indicator.
Panels B, C, and D include a full set of industry dummies. “PM connected” means the ﬁrm
has an identiﬁable connection with key government oﬃcials from Gomez and Jomo (1997).
The precrisis period refers to 1990–96, the crisis period refers to 1997–98, and postcrisis to the
period 1999–2003. Investment is capital expenditures/gross ﬁxed assets, growth is the log an-
nual real growth rate in sales, leverage is total debt/total assets, and proﬁtability is return on
assets. Numbers in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics (adjusted for ﬁrm-
level clustering in panel A).
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
34. In panels B, C, and D, the results are very similar if we use the same set of ﬁrms in each.11.5 and table 11.4, these results suggest that PMC ﬁrms’ advantages were
not manifested in better performance after the resolution of the crisis.35
11.5 Conclusion
We do not ﬁnd evidence that Malaysia’s September 1998 controls were
essential for recovery or structural reforms. Our analysis of the key macro-
economic and ﬁnancial indicators conﬁrms the empirical ﬁndings of
Hutchison (2003) that Malaysia’s macroeconomic performance after the
imposition of capital controls was comparable to that of other countries re-
covering from the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. The controls were imposed late, af-
ter a big depreciation and after a large amount of capital had already left
the country, and this limited the potential macroeconomic beneﬁts. At
best, the controls played a preventive role in guarding against perceived
risks to ﬁnancial stability, but in this role they were not tested by any ob-
servable pressure. As far as we can determine, Malaysia’s successful recov-
ery resulted from the country’s strong fundamentals, sound policies, and
eﬀective institutions, rather than from the capital controls. It would thus be
misleading to draw any general lessons applicable to other countries based
on Malaysia’s experience with capital controls during the Asian crisis.
However, the ﬁrm-level evidence from Malaysia supports the idea that
the stock market interpreted the events of September 1998 as helping po-
litically connected ﬁrms (relative to unconnected ﬁrms). Firms with polit-
ical connections were expected by the stock market to lose beneﬁts in the
ﬁrst phase of the Asian crisis. Conversely, ﬁrms connected to the prime
minister were expected to gain beneﬁts when capital controls were imposed
in September 1998.
The presence of political connections in East Asian economies does not
mean that these connections caused the crisis or even that relationship-
based capitalism was necessarily a suboptimal system for these countries.
While politically connected ﬁrms were hit harder during the crisis, the data
do not indicate that this was a punishment for past misdeeds and deﬁcien-
cies. The evidence suggests rather that investors interpreted the crisis as in-
dicating that previously favored ﬁrms would lose valuable advantages,
while the imposition of capital controls indicated—at least initially—that
these advantages would be restored for some ﬁrms.
Based on the actual ﬁnancial performance of ﬁrms after the crisis, it is
hard to discern the extent to which ﬁrms actually received special advan-
tages. This could be because ﬁnancial- and corporate-sector reforms re-
sulted in fewer advantages for connected ﬁrms or because connected ﬁrms
did not end up making good use of their privileges.
558 Simon Johnson, Kalpana Kochhar, Todd Mitton, and Natalia Tamirisa
35. Tables 11.4 and 11.5 include both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. We ran the same re-
gressions separately for nonﬁnancial ﬁrms only, without ﬁnding any signiﬁcant diﬀerences.Appendix A
Table A.1 Malaysian Capital Controls (1992–2004)
Date Measure Category
1991 No changes
4/20/1992 Total borrowing by residents in foreign currency from domestic 
commercial and merchant banks to ﬁnance imports of goods 
and services is restricted to the equivalent of 1 million ringgit 
(RM; previously there were no limits).
7/9/1992 Borrowing under the Export Credit Reﬁnance Facilities (both 
pre- and postshipment ﬁnancing) by nonresident-controlled com-
panies will be considered domestic borrowing.
10/24/1992 Oﬀshore guarantees obtained by residents to secure domestic 
borrowing, except oﬀshore guarantees (whether denominated in 
ringgit or foreign currency) without resource to Malaysian resi-
dents and obtained from the licensed oﬀshore banks in Labuan to 
secure domestic borrowing, are deemed foreign borrowing. In cases 
where an oﬀshore guarantee is denominated in ringgit, it is subject 
to the condition that, in the event the guarantee is called on, the 
licensed oﬀshore banks in Labuan must make payments in foreign 
currency (with some exceptions), not in ringgit.
11/1/1992 The guidelines on foreign equity capital ownership are liberalized. 
Companies exporting at least 80 percent of their production are no 
longer subject to any equity requirements, whereas companies ex-
porting between 50 percent and 79 percent of their production 
were permitted to hold 100 percent equity, provided that they have 
invested $50 million or more in ﬁxed assets or completed projects 
with at least 50 percent local value added and that the company’s 
products do not compete with those produced by domestic ﬁrms. 
These guidelines are not to apply to sectors in which limits on 
foreign equity participation have been established.
12/14/1992 Residents and the oﬀshore companies in Labuan are prohibited 
from transacting with the residents of dealing in the currency of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) without speciﬁc prior ap-
proval from the Controller of Foreign Exchange (COFE).
12/22/1993 Nonresident-controlled companies involved in manufacturing and 
tourism-related activities are freely allowed to obtain domestic 
credit facilities to ﬁnance the acquisition and/or the development 
of immovable property required for their own business activities.
1/17/1994 A ceiling is placed on the net external liability position of domestic 
banks (excluding trade-related and direct investment inﬂows); re-
moved on January 20, 1995.
1/24/1994 Residents are prohibited from selling the following Malaysian se-
curities to nonresidents: banker’s acceptances; negotiable instru-
ments of deposit; Bank Negara bills; treasury bills; government 
securities (including Islamic securities) with a remaining maturity 
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Date Measure Category
2/7/1994 Residents are prohibited from selling to nonresidents all forms of 
private debt securities (including commercial papers, but excluding 
securities convertible into ordinary shares) with a remaining matu-
rity of one year or less.
2/7/1994 The restriction on the sale of Malaysian securities to nonresidents 
is extended to both the initial issue of the relevant security and the 
subsequent secondary market trade.
2/23/1994 Prohibition of forward transactions (on bid side) and nontrade-
related swaps by commercial banks with foreign customers to cur-
tail the speculative activities of oﬀshore agents seeking long posi-
tions in ringgit (lifted on August 16, 1994).
8/12/1994 Residents are permitted to sell to nonresidents any Malaysian se-
curities.
12/1/1994 Residents may borrow in foreign currency up to a total of the 
equivalent of RM5 million from nonresidents and from commercial 
and merchant banks in Malaysia.
12/1/1994 Nonresident-controlled companies are allowed to obtain credit fa-
cilities, including immovable property loans, up to RM10 million 
without speciﬁc approval, provided that at least 60 percent of their 
total credit facilities from banking institutions are obtained from 
Malaysian-owned ﬁnancial institutions.
12/1/1994 Nonresidents with valid work permits may obtain domestic bor-
rowing to ﬁnance up to 60 percent of the purchase price of residen-
tial property for their own accommodation.
6/27/1995 Corporate residents with a domestic credit facility are allowed to 
remit funds up to the equivalent of RM10 million for overseas in-
vestment purposes each calendar year.
2/1/1996 The threshold for the completion of the statistical forms for each 
remittance to, or receipt of funds from, nonresidents is raised from 
RM50,000 to RM100,000 or its equivalent in foreign currency.
8/4/1997 Controls are imposed on banks to limit outstanding noncommer-
cial-related ringgit oﬀer-side swap transactions (i.e., forward order/
spot purchases of ringgit by foreign customers) to $2 million per 
foreign customer or its equivalent. Hedging requirements of foreign-
ers for trade-related and genuine portfolio and foreign direct invest-
ment investments are excluded.
8/4/1997 Residents are allowed to enter into non-commercial-related swap 
transactions up to a limit (no limits existed previously).
8/28/1997 A ban on short-selling of the listed securities on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) is introduced to limit speculative pressures 





































560 Simon Johnson, Kalpana Kochhar, Todd Mitton, and Natalia TamirisaTable A.1 (continued)
Date Measure Category
9/1/1998 A requirement is introduced to repatriate all ringgit held oﬀshore 
(including ringgit deposits in overseas banks) by October 1, 1998 
(Bank Negara approval thereafter).
9/1/1998 Approval requirement is imposed to transfer funds between exter-
nal accounts (freely allowed previously) and for the use of funds 
other than permitted purposes (i.e., purchase of RM assets).
9/1/1998 Licensed oﬀshore banks are prohibited from trading in ringgit as-
sets (allowed up to permitted limits previously).
9/1/1998 A limit is introduced on exports and imports of ringgit by residents 
and nonresident travelers, eﬀective September 1, 1998 (no limits 
existed previously).
9/1/1998 Residents are prohibited from granting ringgit credit facilities to 
nonresident corresponding banks and stockbroking companies 
(subject to a limit previously).
9/1/1998 Residents are prohibited from obtaining ringgit credit facilities 
from nonresidents (subject to a limit previously).
9/1/1998 All imports and exports are required to be settled in foreign cur-
rency.
9/1/1998 All purchases and sales of ringgit facilities can only be transacted 
through authorized depository institutions.
9/1/1998 Approval requirement for nonresidents to convert ringgit in exter-
nal accounts into foreign currency, except for purchases of ringgit 
assets, conversion of proﬁts, dividends, interest, and other permit-
ted purposes (no such restrictions previously).
9/1/1998 No restriction on conversion of ringgit funds in external accounts 
of nonresidents with work permits, embassies, high commissions, 
central banks, international organizations, and missions of foreign 
countries in Malaysia.
9/1/1998 A twelve-month waiting period for nonresidents to convert ringgit 
proceeds from the sale of Malaysian securities held in external ac-
counts (excluding FDI, repatriation of interest, dividends, fees, 
commissions, and rental income from portfolio investment). No 
such restrictions previously.
9/1/1998 A prior approval requirement beyond a certain limit for all resi-
dents to invest abroad in any form (previously applied only to cor-
porate residents with domestic borrowing).
9/1/1998 Trading in Malaysian shares on Singapore’s Central Limit Order 
Bank (CLOB) over-the-counter market becomes de facto prohib-
ited as a result of strict enforcement of the existing law requiring 
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Date Measure Category
9/1/1998 A speciﬁc limit on exports of foreign currency by residents and up 
to the amount brought into Malaysia for nonresidents (previously, 
no restriction on export of foreign currency on person or in bag-
gage of a traveler; export by other means required approval, regard-
less of amount).
9/1/1998 No restriction on conversion of ringgit funds in external accounts 
of nonresidents with work permits, embassies, high commissions, 
central banks, international organizations, and missions of foreign 
countries in Malaysia.
9/1/1998 A speciﬁc limit on exports of foreign currency by residents and the 
amount brought into Malaysia for nonresidents (previously, no re-
striction on export of foreign currency on person or in baggage of 
a traveler; export by other means required approval, regardless of 
amount).
12/12/1998 Residents are allowed to grant loans to nonresidents for purchases 
of immovable properties from December 12, 1998, to January 12, 
1999.
1/13/1999 Designated nonresident accounts for futures trading are allowed 
and exempt from the twelve-month holding period.
1/13/1999 Capital ﬂows for the purpose of trading derivatives on the com-
modity and monetary exchange of Malaysia and the Kuala Lumpur 
options and ﬁnancial futures exchange are permitted for nonresi-
dents, without being subject to the rules governing external ac-
counts, when transactions are conducted through “designated exter-
nal accounts” that can be created with tier 1 commercial banks in 
Malaysia. (From September 1999, the classiﬁcation of tier 1 and 
tier 2 banks became no longer applicable: all commercial banks 
were allowed to open designated accounts for nonresidents.)
2/15/1999 The twelve-month waiting period is replaced with a graduated sys-
tem of exit levies on the repatriation of the principal of capital in-
vestments (in shares, bonds, and other ﬁnancial instruments, except 
for property investments) made prior to February 15, 1999. The 
levy decreases over the duration of the investment, and thus penal-
izes earlier repatriations; the levy is 30 percent if repatriated less 
than seven months after entry, 20 percent if repatriated in seven to 
nine months; and 10 percent if nine to twelve months. No levy on 
principal if repatriated after twelve months.
2/18/1999 Repatriation of funds relating to investments in immovable prop-
erty is exempted from the exit levy regulations.
3/1/1999 The ceiling on the import and export of ringgit for border trade 
with Thailand is raised.
4/5/1999 Investors in the Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing and 
Automated Quotation (MESDAQ) are exempted from the exit levy 
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Date Measure Category
7/8/1999 Residents are allowed to grant overdraft facility in aggregate not 
exceeding RM200 million for intraday and not exceeding RM5 
million for overnight to a foreign stockbroking company, subject to 
certain conditions.
9/21/1999 Commercial banks are allowed to enter into short-term currency 
swap arrangement with nonresident stockbrokers to cover for pay-
ment for purchases of shares on the KLSE and in outright ringgit 
forward sale contract with nonresidents who have ﬁrm commit-
ment to purchase shares on the KLSE, for maturity period not ex-
ceeding ﬁve working days and with no rollover option.
10/4/1999 Residents are allowed to grant ringgit loans to nonresidents for 
purchases of immovable properties from October 29, 1999, to De-
cember 7, 1999.
3/14/2000 Funds arising from sale of securities purchased by nonresidents on 
the CLOB can be repatriated without payment of exit levy.
4/24/2000 Nonresident-controlled companies raising domestic credit through 
private debt securities are exempted from RM19 million limit and 
the 50:50 requirement for issuance of private debt securities on ten-
der basis through the fully automated system for tendering, to de-
velop domestic bond market.
6/29/2000 Administrative procedures issued to facilitate classiﬁcation of pro-
ceeds from the sale of CLOB securities as being free from levy.
7/27/2000 Residents and nonresidents are no longer required to make a dec-
laration in the traveler’s declaration form as long as they carry cur-
rency notes and/or traveler’s checks within the permissible limits. 
For nonresidents, the declaration is incorporated into the embarka-
tion card issued by the immigration department.
9/30/2000 Licensed oﬀshore banks in the Labuan international oﬀshore ﬁ-
nance center are allowed to invest in ringgit assets and instruments 
in Malaysia for their own accounts only and not on behalf of cli-
ents. The investments cannot be ﬁnanced by ringgit borrowing.
12/1/2000 Foreign-owned banks in Malaysia are allowed to extend up to 50 
percent (previously 40 percent) of the total domestic credit facilities 
to nonresident-controlled companies, in case of credit facilities ex-
tended by resident banks. This is to fulﬁll Malaysia’s commitment 
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services.
12/10/2000 Licensed commercial banks are allowed to extend intraday over-
draft facilities not exceeding RM200 million in aggregate and over-
night facilities not exceeding RM10 million (previously 5 million) 
to foreign stockbroking companies and foreign global custodian 
banks.
2/1/2001 The exit levy on proﬁts repatriated after one year from the month 
the proﬁts are realized is abolished. Portfolio proﬁts repatriated 
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Date Measure Category
5/1/2001 The 10 percent exit levy imposed on proﬁts arising from portfolio 
investments repatriated within one year of realization is abolished.
6/1/2001 All controls on the trading of futures and options by nonresidents 
on the Malaysian Derivatives Exchange (MDEX) are eliminated. 
The Commodity and Monetary Exchange of Malaysia and the 
KLSE merge to form the MDEX.
6/13/2001 Resident insurance companies are allowed to extend ringgit policy 
loans to nonresident policy holders with the terms and conditions 
of the policies. The amount of ringgit loans extended may not ex-
ceed the policy’s attained cash surrender value and may be for the 
duration of the policies.
7/10/2001 Resident ﬁnancial institutions are allowed to extent ringgit loans to 
nonresidents to ﬁnance the purchase or construction of any immov-
able property in Malaysia (excluding ﬁnancing for purchases of 
land only) up to a maximum of three property loans in aggregate.
11/21/2002 Banks are allowed to extend additional ringgit credit facilities to 
nonresidents up to an aggregate of RM5 million per nonresident to 
ﬁnance projects undertaken in Malaysia. Prior to this, credit facili-
ties in ringgit to nonresidents for purposes other than purchases 
of three immovable properties or a vehicle were limited to 
RM2000,000.
12/3/2002 In addition to obtaining property loans to ﬁnance new purchases 
or construction of any property in Malaysia, nonresidents may also 
reﬁnance their ringgit domestic property loans. The above is subject 
to a maximum of three property loans.
12/3/2002 The limit of RM10,000 equivalent in foreign currency for invest-
ment abroad by residents under the Employee Share Option/
Purchase Scheme is removed. Eﬀective this date, general permission 
is granted for overseas investment for this purpose.
12/3/2002 Payments between residents and nonresidents as well as between 
nonresidents for ringgit assets are liberalized to allow payments to 
be made in either ringgit or foreign currency (previously, only in 
ringgit).
3/7/2003 Banking institutions as a group are permitted to extend ringgit 
overdraft facilities, not exceeding RM500,000 in aggregate, to a 
nonresident customer, if the credit facilities are fully covered at all 
times by ﬁxed deposits placed by the nonresident customer with the 
banking institutions extending the credit facilities.
4/1/2003 Exporters are allowed to retain a portion of their export proceeds 
in foreign currency accounts with onshore licensed banks in Malay-
sia with overnight limits ranging between the equivalent of US$1 
million and US$70 million, or any other amount that has been ap-
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Date Measure Category
4/1/2003 Residents are allowed to sell up to twelve months forward foreign 
currency receivables for ringgit to an authorized dealer for any pur-
pose, if the transaction is supported by a ﬁrm underlying commit-
ment to receive such currency.
4/1/2003 The overnight limit on foreign currency export proceeds that may 
be retained by resident exporters in foreign currency accounts with 
designated banks in Malaysia is raised to a range between the 
equivalent of US$1 million and US$70 million, from overnight 
limits of between US$1 and US$10 million.
4/1/2003 The maximum amount of payment of proﬁts, dividends, rental in-
come, and interest to a nonresident on all bona ﬁde investments 
that may be remitted without prior approval, but upon completion 
of statistical forms, is increased from RM10,000 to RM50,000, or 
its equivalent in foreign currency, per transaction.
5/21/2003 The threshold level for acquisition by foreign and Malaysian inter-
ests exempted from Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) approval 
is raised from RM5 million to RM10 million. Acquisition propo-
sals by licensed manufacturing companies are centralized at the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), while cor-
porate proposals are centralized at the Securities Commission. 
These proposals no longer require FIC consideration.
6/17/2003 Foreign equity holding in manufacturing projects is allowed up to 
100 percent for all types of investment.
4/1/2004 Residents are allowed to sell forward nonexport foreign currency 
receivables for ringgit or another foreign currency to an authorized 
dealer or an approved merchant bank for any purpose, provided 
the transaction is supported by an underlying commitment to re-
ceive currency.
4/1/2004 Residents with permitted foreign currency borrowing are allowed 
to enter into interest rate swaps with onshore licensed banks, ap-
proved merchant banks, or licensed oﬀshore banks in Labuan, pro-
vided that the transaction is supported by a ﬁrm underlying com-
mitment.
4/1/2004 Resident individuals with funds abroad (not converted from 
ringgit) are allowed to maintain nonexport foreign currency ac-
counts oﬀshore without any limit imposed on overnight balances.
4/1/2004 Resident companies with domestic borrowing are allowed to open 
nonexport foreign currency accounts with licensed onshore banks 
in Malaysia to retain foreign currency receivables other than export 
proceeds with no limit on the overnight balances. Resident compa-
nies without domestic borrowing are allowed to open nonexport 
foreign currency accounts in licensed oﬀshore banks in Labuan up 
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Date Measure Category
4/1/2004 Resident individuals are permitted to open foreign currency ac-
counts to facilitate payments for education and employment over-
seas, with an aggregate overnight limit equivalent to $150,000 with 
Labuan oﬀshore banks. Previously, the limit was $100,000 ($50,000 
for overseas banks).
4/1/2004 Resident individuals who have foreign currency funds are allowed 
to invest freely in any foreign currency products oﬀered by onshore 
licensed banks.
4/1/2004 The amount of export proceeds that residents may retain in foreign 
currency accounts with licensed onshore banks is increased from 
the range of $1 million to $70 million to the range of $30 million to 
$70 million.
4/1/2004 COFE approval is required for the issuance of ringgit bonds in 
Malaysia by multinational development institutions and foreign 
multinational corporations.
4/1/2004 Resident banks and nonbanks are permitted to extend ringgit loans 
to ﬁnance or reﬁnance the purchase or construction of any immov-
able property in Malaysia (excluding ﬁnancing for purchases of 
land only) up to a maximum of three property loans in aggregate.
4/1/2004 The limit for banking institutions on loans to nonresidents (exclud-
ing stockbroking companies, custodian banks and correspondent 
banks) is raised from RM200,000 to RM10,000,000.
4/1/2004 Licensed insurers and takaful operators (Islamic insurance) are al-
lowed to invest abroad up to 5 percent of their margins of solvency 
and total assets. These entities are also allowed to invest up to 10 
percent of net asset value in their own investment-linked funds.
4/1/2004 Unit trust management companies are allowed to invest abroad the 
full amount of net asset value attributed to nonresidents, and up to 
10 percent of net asset value attributed to residents, without prior 
COFE approval. In addition, fund/asset managers are allowed to 
invest abroad up to the full amount of investments of nonresident 
clients and up to 10 percent of investments of their resident clients.
4/1/2004 Bank Negara Malaysia liberalizes its foreign exchange adminis-
tration rules to facilitate multilateral development banks (MDBs) 
or multilateral ﬁnancial institutions (MFIs) to raise ringgit-
denominated bonds in the Malaysian capital market. The size of 
the bond to be issued by MDBs or MFIs should be large enough 
to contribute to the development of the domestic bond market, and 
the minimum tenure of the bonds should be three years. Ringgit 
funds raised from the issuance of ringgit-denominated bonds can 
be used either in Malaysia or overseas. There will be no restriction 
for MDB or MFI issuers and nonresident investors of ringgit-
denominated bonds to maintain foreign currency accounts, or 
ringgit accounts as external accounts with onshore licensed banks 
in Malaysia. MDBs, MFIs, or nonresident investors can enter into 
forward foreign exchange contracts or swap arrangements to hedge 
ringgit exposure, and MDB or MFI issuers can enter into interest 
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Date Measure Category
4/1/2004 Bank Negara Malaysia liberalizes rules to facilitate foreign multi-
national corporations (MNCs) to raise ringgit-denominated bonds 
in the Malaysian capital market. The ringgit funds raised from such 
issues can be used in Malaysia or overseas.
MNC issuers and nonresident investors of ringgit-denominated 
bonds can maintain, without restrictions, foreign currency accounts 
or ringgit accounts as external accounts with any onshore licensed 
bank. MNC issuers or nonresident investors will be allowed for-
ward exchange contracts of swap arrangements to hedge ringgit 
exposures, and MNC issuers will be allowed interest rate swap ar-
rangements with onshore banks.
Sources: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, and Bank Negara
Malaysia, Annual Report and Exchange Notices, various years.
Appendix B
Coding of Firms
We code as “politically connected” any ﬁrm that Gomez and Jomo (1997)
identify as having oﬃcers or major shareholders with close relationships
with key government oﬃcials—primarily the prime minister and the
ﬁnance minister (and their allies). For example, Gomez and Jomo (1997)
state that a ﬁrm we will call Firm A is “controlled by [Person X], who is
closely linked to [an ally of the Prime Minister]” (p. 103), so Firm A is
coded as politically connected, with the prime minister as the primary con-
nection (Gomez and Jomo reveal actual names; we have dropped these
here). As another example, Gomez and Jomo (1997) state, “The chairman
of [Firm B] was [Person Y] of the [Group J], a close friend of [the] Prime
Minister” (p. 59). Thus, Firm B is coded as politically connected, with its pri-
mary connection listed as the prime minister. As a ﬁnal example, Gomez
and Jomo (1997) state that “[Person Z], probably [the Finance Minister’s]
closest conﬁdant, has an interest” in Firm C (p. 57). This results in 
Firm C being coded as politically connected, with the ﬁnance minister as
the primary connection. We search the entire text of Gomez and Jomo
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36. The detailed coding is available from the authors upon request.References
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Comment Peter Blair Henry
I like this paper a lot. Discussions of capital controls can be highly ideo-
logical and strangely unencumbered by the facts. In contrast, this paper
takes a sensible look at the data and does not force them to tell a story that
is not really there.
The paper focuses on two central questions, one macroeconomic in na-
ture and the other microeconomic. The macro question is the obvious one:
did the Malaysian capital controls ease the impact of the Asian crisis on the
Malaysian economy? Since GDP plummeted in 1998 and bounced back in
1999, it is tempting to conclude that the controls had a positive eﬀect.
However, the paper argues that the data are actually inconclusive. The
problem is that we observe a similar V-shaped pattern in the GDP of two
East Asian economies that did not impose capital controls: Korea and
Thailand.
Furthermore, capital controls in Malaysia were imposed at the depth of
the crisis—too late for any reasonable analysis to conclude that the con-
trols had an eﬀect, for good or ill. In the ideal real-world experiment,
Malaysia would have imposed capital controls at the same time that Korea
and Thailand signed agreements with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). But Malaysia did not impose capital controls until several months
after the Korea and Thailand IMF agreements. Therefore, a comparison
of Malaysia versus Korea and Thailand is legitimate only if you assume
that in September of 1998 Malaysia was in the same place that Korea and
Thailand were when they signed their agreements. The authors do not
think that this is a legitimate assumption. I agree.
Overall, the paper argues that Malaysia weathered the crisis by follow-
ing sound macroeconomic policy. The authors declare: “We should em-
phasize that throughout the crisis and the capital control period the
authorities pursued good macroeconomic and structural policies.” This
observation notwithstanding, the paper also notes a slightly worrisome
macro fact: private investment in Malaysia has fallen from an average
of 25 percent of GDP before the crisis to less than 15 percent of GDP 
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Peter Blair Henry is an associate professor of economics and the John and Cynthia Fry
Gunn Faculty Scholar in the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University, and a fac-
ulty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.after the crisis. The paper argues that a deterioration of institutions stem-
ming from the imposition of capital controls may explain the fall in private
investment. Toward the end of my comments I will suggest a more pedes-
trian explanation that also questions the assertion that Malaysia pursued
“good” macro policy.
The paper also asks a microeconomic question: did ﬁrms with political
connections beneﬁt from the imposition of capital controls? In the after-
math of the Asian crisis, Malaysia was one of a number of countries ac-
cused of crony capitalism: ﬁrms with connections to the government en-
joyed subsidies and beneﬁts that unconnected ﬁrms did not. The onset of
the crisis provides an opportunity to use the stock market to examine the
validity of such assertions. If politically connected ﬁrms beneﬁted from
crony capitalism and the onset of a ﬁnancial crisis signaled the end of that
arrangement, then we would expect the stock prices of connected ﬁrms to
be aﬀected more adversely by the onset of a ﬁnancial crisis than the prices
of unconnected ﬁrms.
This is exactly what the paper shows. While the aggregate value of the
Malaysian stock market declined from July 1997 through August 1998 (the
period of the crisis), the stock price decline of ﬁrms with political connec-
tions to Prime Minister Mahathir was 8 percentage points larger than that
of unconnected ﬁrms. Similarly, when capital controls were imposed on
September 1, 1998, stock prices rose, but the average stock price increase
of ﬁrms with connections to Mahathir was 19.9 percentage points greater
than that of the typical unconnected ﬁrm. Furthermore, ﬁrms with con-
nections to Anwar, the former minister of ﬁnance (he was ﬁred on Sep-
tember 2, 1998) experienced a stock price increase that was 6.3 percentage
points less than that of the unconnected ﬁrms. In other words, from July
1997 to August 1998, the market considered political connections a liabil-
ity. Once controls were imposed, connections with Mahathir became an as-
set, while connections with Anwar were a liability (more on this later).
While the ﬁrm-level results support the paper’s central thesis that polit-
ical connections aﬀect corporate valuation, they also raise two important
issues of interpretation. First, why did the market interpret the onset of the
crisis in July 1997 as the imminent end of crony capitalism, and why was
the imposition of capital controls in September 1998 viewed in exactly the
opposite fashion? The paper argues that relationships between politicians,
banks, and ﬁrms are easier to maintain when the economy is isolated from
international capital ﬂows (Rajan and Zingales 2003). The problem with
this argument is that it does not explain how government-ﬁrm relation-
ships persisted in the face of free capital ﬂows before the crisis. Moreover,
I think there is a simpler story that relates to the second point of interpre-
tation I want to raise.
The paper shows that the overall value of the stock market (both con-
nected and unconnected ﬁrms) rose by 40 percent in September of 1998. If
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prices of unconnected ﬁrms rebound at all? It is true that the stock price in-
crease may have been driven by news that the economy was recovering. But
if the economy seemed to be recovering, then why did the government im-
pose capital controls? One answer to this question is that Mahathir wanted
to undermine his political opponent, Anwar, the minister of ﬁnance (and
deputy prime minister). The chronology of events in Malaysia justiﬁes this
assertion and provides a more direct explanation for why the stock market
reacted so diﬀerently to the onset of the crisis in 1997 and the imposition
of capital controls in 1998.
Remember, while Prime Minister Mahathir was famously blaming
George Soros and hedge fund managers for Malaysia’s economic and ﬁ-
nancial woes, Anwar was trying to reassure investors that Malaysia would
not adopt economic policies to match Mahathir’s populist, anti-western-
capitalist rhetoric. So there was a battle of ideas, as it were. The following
exchange between Mahathir and Anwar at a press conference in October
1997 best illustrates the mounting tension between the two men (Freedman
2004):
Mahathir: “The press is asking questions. I’m answering and tomorrow
the currency traders will push the Ringgit down because I opened my
mouth.”
Anwar (laughing): “Then I will clarify and the press will say we are quar-
reling.” (Jayasankaran 1997)
Two months after that exchange, in December 1997, Anwar announced a
series of austerity measures that were seen as an attempt to reverse Ma-
hathir’s long-standing policy of subsidizing favored corporations. In the
months following the exchange, Mahathir became even more aggressive
about bailing out high-proﬁle companies (Freedman 2004).
The political events in Indonesia during early 1998 provide important
additional context for understanding the link between Mahathir and An-
war’s political struggle, capital controls, and the stock market. In April of
1998, President Suharto of Indonesia agreed to adopt a number of eco-
nomic reform measures in return for ﬁnancial assistance from the IMF.
One month later, amid protests sparked (in part) by the hardships caused
by the reforms, Suharto was forced to resign after thirty-two years as In-
donesian head of state.
I am not suggesting that Indonesia’s signing of an IMF agreement was
responsible for Suharto’s downfall, but Mahathir clearly seemed to link the
two events in his mind. Following Suharto’s resignation, Mahathir began
moving more aggressively to bring down Anwar. On June 24, 1998, Ma-
hathir placed Daim Zainuddin in charge of economic policy. On Sep-
tember 1, 1998, Mahathir imposed capital controls. The next day he ﬁred
Anwar.
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minister gave the clearest possible indication that Mahathir had no inten-
tion of taking the economy in the direction of economic reforms and ﬁscal
austerity. In other words, what this sequence of events reveals is not that
capital controls per se make it easier to maintain subsidies, but rather that
the imposition of capital controls was an unambiguous signal that Ma-
hathir had no intention of signing an IMF agreement that would bring an
end to subsidies.
Now we see why prices fell more for connected ﬁrms during the period
prior to the imposition of capital controls. In addition to the macroeco-
nomic shock of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, there was concern that the end of
politically driven subsidies was nigh. Reserves were falling because the
central bank was defending the currency, the fall in reserves might force the
government to borrow money from the IMF, and IMF conditionality
would likely put a stop to the gravy train for politically connected ﬁrms.
The sacking of Anwar paved the way for expansionary ﬁscal policy that
allowed the government to maintain corporate subsidies even in the face of
a contracting economy—this is where the macro and micro stories con-
verge. To illustrate the point more clearly, I present table 11C.1. It shows
that Malaysia’s overall ﬁscal balance went from ﬁve straight years of sur-
plus, including a surplus of 2.4 percent of GDP in 1997, to ﬁve straight
years of deﬁcits. The interesting point is that in the aftermath of capital
controls, Malaysia followed a policy in diametric opposition to the one
that would have been required under an IMF agreement.
Does this table reveal a pattern of reckless spending, or Keynesian ﬁscal
stimulus of a distinctly East Asian variety? Apparently, the deﬁnition of
“good” macroeconomic policy depends on whether you are sitting in
Kuala Lumpur or at the corner of 19th and H! Irrespective of the stance
you take on the soundness of Malaysia’s ﬁscal response to the crisis, one
has to wonder whether an old-fashioned crowding-out story lies behind the
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2003 –5.4subsequent fall in private investment to which the authors allude. This
seems like an issue worthy of further investigation.
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